Mergers with anticompetitive effects can gain regulatory approval if they prove that the benefits of the merger outweigh the negative effects (efficiency defence), and/or if they offer to modify the merger transaction in a way that eliminates these adverse effects (merger remedy). Although these two merger control instruments have been analysed separately, little work has been dedicated to modelling merger litigation where both the provision of efficiency-related evidence and remedy-offers are at the merging firms discretion, which is the case for example in the EC. This paper is an attempt to fill the empirical part of this gap. Its novelty lies not only in empirically modelling the system of decisions that firms face in merger litigation but in using data from company reports on the merger-generated synergy expectations signalled to shareholders, which allows the direct empirical testing of some of the assumptions and findings from previous works. Evidence is presented that firms' own efficiency expectations do not have an impact on the probability of applying for efficiency defence; that pre-merger synergy expectations enhance the willingness to offer remedies; false efficiency claims can be distinguished by looking at the timing of the remedyoffer; and finally, the cost of delay plays a central role in designing firms' litigation strategy, especially when these costs exceed the cost of the remedy. prove that the bene…ts of the merger outweigh the negative e¤ects (e¢ ciency defence), and/or if they o¤er to modify the merger transaction in a way that eliminates these adverse e¤ects (merger remedy). Although these two merger control instruments have been analysed separately, little work has been dedicated to modelling merger litigation where both the provision of e¢ ciencyrelated evidence and remedy-o¤ers are at the merging …rms discretion, which is the case for example in the EC. This paper is an attempt to …ll the empirical part of this gap. Its novelty lies not only in empirically modelling the system of decisions that …rms face in merger litigation but in using data from company reports on the merger-generated synergy expectations signalled to shareholders, which allows the direct empirical testing of some of the assumptions and …ndings from previous works. Evidence is presented that …rms'own e¢ ciency y Norwich Business School and ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, email: p.ormosi@uea.ac.uk 1 expectations do not have an impact on the probability of applying for e¢ -ciency defence; that pre-merger synergy expectations enhance the willingness to o¤er remedies; false e¢ ciency claims can be distinguished by looking at the timing of the remedy-o¤er; and …nally, the cost of delay plays a central role in designing …rms'litigation strategy, especially when these costs exceed the cost of the remedy.
Introduction
Merger control is focused on governing mergers that hinder competition and are large enough for this e¤ect to be harmful for the society. The competition authority (CA) investigates these mergers and, if evidence is found of the anti-competitive e¤ects, prohibits them. When determining the competitive impact of a merger, the CA takes into account expected e¢ ciencies put forward by the merging …rms (e¢ ciency defence). The e¢ ciencies brought about by the merger can counteract the negative e¤ects on competition and the potential harm to consumers. If these e¢ ciencies are su¢ cient enough to outweigh the anticompetitive e¤ects, the CA will approve the merger. In the absence of e¢ ciency gains, anticompetitive mergers may also receive regulatory approval if parties to the merger o¤er a settlement package (merger remedy) to the CA, which modi…es the noti…ed merger transaction, as a result of which the anticompetitive e¤ects are eliminated.
The common factor in the above two legal instruments (merger remedies and e¢ ciency defence) in many jurisdictions is that they both have to be initiated by the merging parties. The CA is not in the position to impose remedies on the merging parties, but it can assess whether the remedies are capable of eliminating the competition problem. Similar rules apply to e¢ ciency claims. Given the information asymmetry between the CA and the merging …rms, the CA only takes those substantiated and likely e¢ ciencies into account that were brought forward by the merging parties. Merging …rms' litigation strategy may therefore take three main forms: o¤er a settlement, provide evidence on e¢ ciencies, or do both.
There is an ever increasing body of literature that has developped ways to theoretically model merger litigation but only a few of them addresses the possible interaction between the above two merger control instruments. To mention some of the most recent works, papers by Lagerlöf and Heidhues (2005) , Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) , or Neven and Röller (2005) model merger litigation with a special focus on e¢ ciency claims. Garrod and Lyons (2011) on the other hand focus more on the analysis of remedy-o¤ers in litigation. Some papers however depict merger litigation where both e¢ ciency claims and remedy-o¤ers simultaneously exist and interaction between the two is allowed. For example Cosnita and Tropeano (2009) propose a solution to overcoming the di¢ culties arising from the information asymmetry between the CA and merging …rms by providing a mechanism that extracts e¢ ciency-related information from the merging parties. They suggest that e¢ cient mergers value their assets higher and are therefore less willing to divest them. Bougette (2010) , who analyses the e¤ectiveness of remedies, also found that cost savings reduce the scope of remedies. 1 This paper is an attempt to model merger litigation empirically by looking at how …rms design their litigation strategy, of which e¢ ciency claims and remedyo¤ers both form part. Its novelty lies not only in empirically modelling the system of decisions that …rms face in merger litigation but in using data from company reports on the merger-generated synergy expectations signalled to shareholders. This allows the direct empirical testing of some of the assumptions and …ndings from previous works.
Although the focus of analysis is on European Community mergers, the …ndings of this paper should bear relevance to all jurisdictions that place both remedy o¤ers and e¢ ciency defence at the merging parties'discretion.
The paper presents some evidence that …rms'expectations on merger-generated e¢ ciencies do not determine whether they make e¢ ciency claims before the CA. This is evidence against assumptions that mergers with e¢ ciency evidence in hand always have the incentive to reveal this evidence, something that is used for example in Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) , Neven and Röller (2005) , or CT. Rather, some mergers with relevant evidence may decide to keep quiet about it, potentially for reasons discussed in LH.
2 At the same time, other mergers that have no e¢ ciencyrelated evidence may try to blu¤ and make e¢ ciency claims. Both CT and Bougette (2010) claim that cost savings reduce the willingness to 1 For the repetitive referencing to the Lagerlof and Heidhues (2005) , the Cosnita and Tropeano (2009) , and the Garrod and Lyons (2011) papers, they are hereinafter denoted as LH, CT, and GL respectively.
2 LH argue that by choosing the enforcement regime (laissez-faire, hard-evidence, or strict regime) CAs can in ‡uence the amount of evidence merging …rms provide on e¢ ciencies. A strict regime never allows for e¢ ciency defence, a lasses-fair regime always approves mergers, and a hard-evidence regime requires strong e¢ ciency-related evidence.
o¤er a divestiture. Although this paper only makes inferences on the size of divestitures relative to the level required by the CA, evidence is presented that …rms only exhibit reluctance to o¤er large upfront remedies when they made e¢ ciency claims to the CA (blu¢ ng or genuine claims). When they choose to withhold e¢ ciencyrelated evidence they become more eager to …nd an early settlement and this e¤ect becomes stronger the more e¢ ciencies they signalled to shareholders. One possible explanation to this could be that given the higher saving expectations, these mergers are expected to be more delay-averse (higher cost of delay) and are therefore likely to be o¤ering overly large remedies to gain early approval, as proposed by GL.
Finally, evidence is provided on the phenomenon that mergers with higher ef…ciency expectations -i.e. more delay-averse mergers -are willing to reach early settlement by making larger and quicker remedy-o¤ers except when they made e¢ -ciency claims to the Commission. This implies that …rms may have an expectation of tailoring remedies to take the total e¤ect of mergers (including e¢ ciency gains) into account, the importance of which has been highlighted by Röller and de la Mano (2006) . The paper is structured as follows. First, the motivation is given together with a set of testable hypotheses, which stem from preliminarily observed data, the characteristics of the EC merger control regime, and the priors brought from theoretical papers. This is followed by a model of the system of decisions in merger litigation. The data and the key variables are then introduced, followed by a discussion of the exogeneity of these variables and potential selection bias issues. Based on the assumptions and the chosen model, a set of estimates are presented and their economic interpretation is discussed. The paper concludes with an analysis of the robustness of the results to the assumptions made.
Motivation of the paper and testable hypotheses
The motivation of this paper came from the preliminary results of a research into the synergies signalled to shareholders by EC merging …rms pre-merger. Figure 1 plots the number of cases with such signals and compares it to the number of times Figure 1 : Number of cases with e¢ ciency expectations (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) these saving expectations were revealed to the Commission.
It appears that only a fraction of the saving expectations are revealed to the Commission. This is even more remarkable knowing that the merger process starts much before it is noti…ed to the competition authority. Clean teams build detailed …nancial models for assessing cost synergies arising from the merger, usually broken down to production levels or even to units.
3 They provide monitoring instruments for tracking synergies, advice lawyers on regulatory issues, and set up the postmerger governance model. 4 This is often a result of months of rather costly work of clean teams, and in-house experts, who are paid even if the merger does not need a regulatory authorisation. With this information in hand, no extra direct costs are incurred by bringing this evidence forward to the Commission, and one would thus expect that many mergers will do so. However, the Commission's case law suggests that e¢ ciency claims take a long time to investigate and can typically only be done in frame of a lengthy second phase investigation. 5 This potential delay represents 3 As the pre-merger cooperation or coordination of …rms would trigger the intervention of anticartel agencies, merging parties often hire clean teams to design an e¤ective integration strategy. Clean teams carry the mandate of the merging parties and have legal clearance to analyse any relevant company data and work under strict con…dentiality.
4 See more on clean teams in Chanmugam et al. (2005) . 5 Ormosi (2011) provides a summary of these e¤ects.
extra costs for the merging parties. These two e¤ects (having the evidence in hand, and facing the prospect of a delay as a result of providing this evidence) should, in theory, simultaneously determine how much e¢ ciency-related evidence …rms reveal to the CA. Although LH provide a framework for analysing how the CA's behaviour in ‡u-ences this decision, it is uncertain how their results would impact remedy o¤ers in a scenario that allows for the fact that merger approval can also be gained by o¤ering a suitable set of remedies. The main driver of my research was to …nd the determinants of this complex choice in a setting where e¢ ciency evidence and remedy o¤ers can both lead to approval.
The regulatory framework
In order to understand how the obstruction of evidence may be of …rms' interest some understanding of the underlying legal system is needed. When …rms decide to merge, they know whether their transaction will be subject to regulatory approval. As litigation can reduce shareholder wealth, it is assumed that …rms have an interest in avoiding it, or -if inevitable -seek some type of settlement as quickly as possible.
According to the European Merger Regulation, 6 an otherwise anti-competitive merger can be approved only if the bene…ts arising from the merger outweigh the negative e¤ects, but the burden of proof is on the merging parties. 7 This would suggest that withholding information on the bene…ts makes very little sense. However, the assessment of e¢ ciencies is very likely to trigger a lengthy investigation, 7 See Paragraph 87 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 8 In the context of European merger control the Commission appraises the noti…ed merger before deciding on whether to initiate proceedings. If it can be concluded from available evidence that the merger does not raise serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market, or if there are doubts but they are eliminated by the modi…cations o¤ered by the merging parties the Commission may approve the merger without initiating proceedings. 
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arising from delay but also the uncertainty surrounding the approval of the merger, which may negatively in ‡uence the shareholder valuation of the merging …rms.
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Given this environment it is crucial that merging parties also have the possibility of agreeing on some sort of settlement with the competition authority, which modi…es the original transaction and remedies the anti-competitive e¤ects of the merger, for example by divesting some of their assets. This of course comes at the cost of losing the divested assets.
11 This is made even more complex given that the perceived cost of this divestiture potentially increases with the shareholder valuation of the transaction.
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This means, that in merger jurisdictions such as the EC, when seeking approval, …rms have to balance between the cost of divesting valuable assets, and the cost of a delay caused by the regulatory assessment of e¢ ciencies. For this reason, if the cost of delay is higher than the cost of divestiture, evidence on e¢ ciencies may be withheld during the investigation. If delay is less costly than divestiture, …rms are expected to reveal e¢ ciency evidence and o¤er only smaller remedies. Figure 2 presents a stylised ‡owchart depicting the two main elements of merger litigation that the merging parties have to address when notifying an anticompetitive merger: (1) whether to reveal e¢ ciency-related evidence; and (2a) how large a modi…cation to o¤er, and (2b) when to make the o¤er.
The …rst decision that merging parties have to make is whether to bring forward e¢ ciency-related evidence or not (conditional on the merger generating such e¢ -ciencies). Firms can always blu¤ and claim e¢ ciencies even if they themselves are not counting on them. Although the ECMR does not set a time limit for e¢ ciency 13 This means that merging parties must have a clear idea whether to disclose e¢ ciency-related evidence to the Commission already at the pre-noti…cation level. This is important for the empirical model presented below as it suggests that …rms'decision on e¢ ciency evidence and remedy-o¤ers are a sequential process. On the second level of the ‡ow chart, parties make remedy-o¤ers. Although under the ECMR merging parties would be free not to o¤er remedies after revealing e¢ ciency claims to the Commission, in the Commission's case law anticompetitive mergers have never been approved without suitable remedies based on e¢ ciency arguments only.
14 If remedies are not o¤ered, the Commission prohibits the merger, 13 The pre-noti…cation phase is an informal stage of EC merger procedures, to discuss jurisdictional and other legal issues. The Commission recommends these discussions to start at least two weeks prior to noti…cation (Paragraph 10 of the DG COMPETITION Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings).
14 There are cases -not in the analysed sample -where the parties revealed merger-speci…c e¢ -ciencies and eventually no intervention was needed but it is very di¢ cult to decide how much weight e¢ ciencies had in convincing the Commission that the merger was harmless. E¢ ciencies in these cases were considered to be one of several factors outweighing anticompetitive e¤ects arising from the transaction but not as the single or exclusive factor. Factors such as the existence of signi…cant buying power, increased competition from outside the EEA, or …nding that the merging parties are not each other's closest competitors (see for example paragraphs 57-64 in COMP/M.4057, Korsnäs/AssiDomän Cartonboard). These decisions also suggest that in the given cases the com-8 unless the merging parties withdraw their case beforehand. 15 It is therefore assumed that remedies are o¤ered in all mergers with anticompetitive e¤ects and …rms only have to decide when to make the o¤er to modify the merger and how large a modi…cation to o¤er, conditional on the decision made on revealing e¢ ciency related evidence. Although logically, the remedies o¤ered should be smaller if e¢ ciencies have also been claimed, the Commission's practice suggests that remedies are not weighted against potential e¢ ciency gains, which was highlighted by Ormosi (2011) . If the merging parties take this into consideration then their remedy-o¤er will be the same even if e¢ ciencies had been claimed before.
Hypotheses
From previous papers and given the background information described above, the following hypotheses are tested.
Hypothesis 1a: Firms engage in mixed signalling (high signals to shareholders, low signals to the regulator) before mergers are consummated. They signal high e¢ ciencies to shareholders but they do not reveal these e¢ ciencies to the competition authority, therefore even with the e¢ ciency-related evidence in hand it may not be revealed to the CA, much in the same way as proposed by LH.
Hypothesis 1b: Firms try to capitalise on the information asymmetry between them and the regulator by claiming e¢ ciencies even when they do not in fact expect them.
Hypothesis 1c: Even with e¢ cieny evidence in hand …rms may choose not to reveal it, therefore assumptions in Motta and Vasconcelos (2005) , Neven and Röller (2005) , or CT, that e¢ ciency related evidence is always shared with the CA, may petition concern was not particularly strong and the merger might have equally been authorised without the e¢ ciency arguments. This is con…rmed by the fact that none of these decisions contain a detailed analysis of the expected e¢ ciencies and these mergers were approved in a phase I procedure. See also COMP/M.3732, Procter & Gamble/Gillette, paragraph 131, COMP/M.3664, Repsol Butano/Shell Gas (LPG), paragraphs 33-35; COMP/M.3886, Aster 2/Flint Ink, paragraph 22.
15 For the lack of data, withdrawal cases are not discussed in this paper. However, from the merger's perspective, prohibition and the withdrawal of the case have the same e¤ect. 9 not hold.
Hypothesis 2: When synergy expectations about a merger are high, …rms seek early settlement by: a) o¤ering to make relatively large modi…cations, and/or b)
o¤ering to modify the merger transaction early in the litigation. These hypotheses seemingly contradict CT and Bougette (2010) who claim that high cost savings reduce the size of remedy-o¤ers. This research however allows synergy expectations to serve as a proxy for cost of delay, which is expected to produce di¤erent results from CT, as discussed above.
Hypothesis 3: Signalling e¢ ciency expectations to the Commission does not reduce …rms'willingness to settle the case by making suitable remedy-o¤ers. Although Röller and de la Mano (2006) suggest that CAs should tailor remedies to take e¢ -ciency gains into account, that is not how …rms perceive the Commission's practice and they o¤er the same remedies even if e¢ ciency related evidence is revealed.
Modelling the litigation strategy of merging parties
The three estimable parameters from Figure 2 are …rms e¢ ciency claims to the Commission (ef f ), and the two measures of …rms'willingness to reach settlement: the size of the remedy-o¤er (rem s ) and the timing of the remedy-o¤er (rem t ).
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These could be arranged in the following unrestricted system of structural equations:
16 The section to follow borrows intensively from Maddala (1983, 242-7) .
Where val is a key exogenous variable that denotes the e¢ ciency expectations signalled to shareholders, n are the coe¢ cients of the potentially endogenous parameters, and " n are the error terms, with E(" n ) = 0, and V ar(" n ) =
2 . x n are vectors of exogenous variables, and n denotes the corresponding parameters. 17 From the data, the system is observed as follows:
Where ef f is a latent variable of which the dichotomous variable ef f is observed and denotes the cases where merging parties made e¢ ciency claims to the Commission; rem s and rem t are observed.
Assumption 1: E(x 0 n " n ) = 0 and E(val" n ) = 0, which is the orthogonality assumption required for x n and val to be exogenous.
The following assumptions reduce this unrestricted system to the one estimated in this paper. These assumptions are required to decide whether all variables that are thought to be endogenous (ef f , rem t , rem s ) in the model in Figure 2 should be included in Equations (1) to (3). First the relationship between ef f and the other variables is considered, then rem s and rem t are examined separately. The robustness of the assumptions made here is discussed in the …nal section.
E¢ ciency claims
Assumption 2: 11 = 12 = 0. This assumption formalises that there is a oneway causality between ef f and rem s or rem t , therefore …rms …rst decide whether to reveal e¢ ciency-related evidence, and then choose the size of the necessary remedy. If Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, then Equation (1) can be estimated using a single equation probit model.
When ef f is a regressor in Equations (2) and (3), if 21 6 = 0 and/or 31 6 = 0 then the following two possibilities are possible. If rem s and/or rem t are observed following some selection criterion arising from ef f , then Heckman's sample selection model could be used. 18 Whether this is the case will be tested later. If there is no sample selection issue and the error terms are not contemporaneously correlated, then we have a recursive model with a continuous and a dichotomous variable. Methods for …tting such models are discussed in Maddala and Lee (1976, p.527) , who show that, if " 1 , " 2 , " 3 are normally distributed, Equation 1 can be estimated using probit, and Equations 2 and 3 using OLS. If " 1 is not independent from " 2 and/or " 3 , then Equation 1 can be estimated using probit, and Equations 2 and 3 can be estimated by replacing ef f by the estimated ( 1 val + 0 1 x 1 ) and using OLS.
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Assumption 3a:
These are the independence assumptions required to simplify the estimation process to a probit method for Equation 1 and a separate estimation of Equations 2 and 3.
Equations 2 and 3
Assumption 4a: 22 = 0 and 33 6 = 0 Assumption 4b: corr(" 2 ; " 3 ) = 0 Assumption 4a states that rem s a¤ects rem t but not the other way round, i.e. …rst parties decide on the size of the o¤er (whether they want to blu¤ or not), which determines their attitude towards settlement and how early they make the o¤er.
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It is unlikely that …rms decide when to make the o¤er before they know what the o¤er would be. If …rms are delay-averse then they will o¤er large, and are more likely to do this early. On the other hand, if they try to blu¤ and start with smaller o¤ers, they might also think that early o¤ers are preferable. To decide which e¤ect dominates, the following hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 4: Firms choosing a blu¢ ng strategy (i.e. making a small o¤er) to reach settlement are more likely to make early o¤ers, thereby allowing themselves more time to adjust their o¤er if the Commission …nds out about the blu¤. This is in line with the arguments in GL, who argue that blu¢ ng about settlement-o¤ers is viable when delay is not very costly for the merging …rms. In these cases …rms would be willing to make a small remedy o¤er. To safeguard from the possibility of a lengthy phase II investigation, it is likely that these blu¢ ng o¤ers are made earlier in order to allow more time to adjust the o¤er in case of a failed blu¤. This should also mean that rem s 'causes'some of the variance in rem t .
Assumption 4b is needed for Equations (2) and (3) to be estimable using OLS. The paper looks at 11 years (1999-2009) of EC merger control. The common denominator of these cases is that they all resulted in anti-competitive e¤ects. For this reason …rms had to either provide e¢ ciency-related evidence, or reach settlement by o¤ering to modify the merger transaction in a way that eliminates the anti-competitive e¤ects (or engage in both). The sampling process used for this research was purposive as it aimed at collecting all of those European Commission cases within the analysed timeframe which involved some sort of intervention from the Commission's part. The Commission's case reports and the Hearing O¢ cer's reports (where available) were used as primary data source.
Between 1990 and 2009, 297 anticompetitive mergers were discussed under the ECRM. 21 The most obvious constraint was the availability of the required data in the text of the decision. The range of available information decreases for older decisions, which resulted in cutting the sample at 1999. Another constraint was given by the availability of case reports in English or French. From the 232 cases in the examined period, twelve were in German, three in Italian, and three in Spanish, leaving 214 cases (over 70 percent of the total number of investigated mergers) to be analysed.
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There is no reason to believe that the non-English or French texts contain cases that are systematically di¤erent from the analysed sample. The analysed sample includes 116 cases under the old ECMR and 98 cases under the new ECMR.
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There was also a reporting bias from the Commission's part, due to the fact that phase I documents do not contain the same amount and level of information as phase II documents. This meant that some of the structural variables (e.g. entry characteristics, market shares outside of the relevant markets) had to be dropped, as this information was simply not reported in the phase I documents. This is also true with regards the comparison between older and more recent documents. Some information that was only reported in, say, post-2004 documents cannot be used for a credible analysis when it is obvious that the lack of information for pre-2004 documents is due to the fact that the Commission had di¤erent reporting policies.
Potentially endogenous variables
ef f is a dichotomous variable that allows a distinction between cases where …rms revealed e¢ ciency related evidence to the Commission, and cases where they did not. Given the limited amount of e¢ ciency-related discussion in these reports, a more ambitious measurement of e¢ ciency claims, other than a binary variable, was not possible.
The size of the remedy was measured using a simple proxy. When remedies are o¤ered, the Commission decides whether a received o¤er is su¢ cient to remedy the competitive concerns.
24 If the o¤er is turned down, then the merging parties have to …nd an alternative remedy that they can include in their subsequent o¤er. 25 If the o¤er is accepted, the case is closed with the Commission's …nal decision. If no suitable o¤er is made by the end of the statutory deadline, then the merger is blocked. The length of time (number of working days) between the …rst o¤er and the closure of the procedure is used as a measure of the size of the …rst o¤er relative to the o¤er needed to eliminate all anti-competitive e¤ects of the merger (rem s ). A short time-period therefore indicates a large enough remedy o¤er to be accepted by the Commission. To facilitate interpretation, rem s was multiplied by minus one, therefore a higher rem s means a relatively larger initial o¤er.
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Finally, for the other element of the willingness to settle, the timing of the …rst remedy (rem t ) is measured by the number of working days between the noti…cation of the merger, and the day the remedy was o¤ered.
Exogenous factors determining merging parties' litigation strategy
One of the novelties of this research is the use of data on pre-merger e¢ ciency expectations. 27 The data collected for this purpose was the quanti…ed merger-generated saving expectations signalled to shareholders pre-merger. 28 As these expectations are based on the pre-merger assessment of the e¤ect of the merger, it is used as a measure of the e¢ ciency-related evidence that …rms have in hand before noti…cation. Four major sources were used for collecting this data: (1) Merging parties'annual reports: The relevant information (pre-merger synergy expectations) was found in the report of the year of the merger announcement. (2) Company press releases: These short informational articles are a brief and prompt signalling means. They are normally available on the merging parties' websites or in their online archives. (3) Business-and-law search engines such as Lexis-Nexis. (4) Google news archives were used to double-check the information acquired through the …rst three steps, or if the annual report was not detailed enough or simply because there was no annual report available. The data on synergy expectations was only used if there were at least three di¤erent news sources reporting the same expectation, around the same time.
To standardise the saving expectation data (i.e. to adjust for di¤erences in …rm size, and length of time needed for the savings to be realised) the present value (pv) -at the time of the merger announcement -of the de ‡ated annual cost savings (cs) was calculated.
29 This is an annuity to be realised in y years following the merger, and it 27 Although synergy expectations were collected from the above listed sources, there have been academic attempts to measure these synergies from other available data. Chang (1988) for example proposes a method for calculating these anticipated synergies using three variables: the acquisition premium paid by the buying …rm, the market value, and the replacement costs of the target …rm. 28 Although it has been shown that saving expectations often fall short, here they only imply merging parties'pre-merger expectations. 29 Quarterly indices (for the corresponding quarter of the merger noti…cation) from the UK Retail Price Index (RPI) were used (published on www.statistics.gov.uk) for de ‡ation.
was assumed that this annuity would last for …ve years in every case. 30 The present value of the annuity in y years following the merger is given by: pv y = . These saving expectations could also be thought of as the cost of delay in merger litigation.
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Information on the size of the transaction (pa) was collected from the same sources as saving expectations. As the absolute size of the merger transaction should not a¤ect how individual mergers are adjudged by the Commission, this variable is not expected to have a signi…cant e¤ect on parties'decisions throughout litigation. 33 The value of the transaction was measured in million GBP.
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The estimated models also control for the interaction between ef f and val. In these models ef f can be interpreted as an e¢ ciency claim when …rms have no genuine e¢ ciency expectations (i.e. when they blu¤ in their claim), val shows the impact of e¢ ciency expectations when …rms withhold e¢ ciency-related evidence, and val ef f shows the impact of these expectations where …rms provide e¢ ciency evidence to the Commission (i.e. when there is no blu¢ ng).
The change in the merger regulation in 2004 (ecmr), which signi…cantly reformed the way how e¢ ciencies can be treated in merger cases, was also expected to play a role in how …rms design their litigation strategy. Although the four-digit part of the Commission's case numbers (cno) has been used in other works to measure the experience of …rms and that of the Commission, its correlation with ecmr makes it 30 Changing this assumption does not have an e¤ect on the …ndings of this paper. 31 A 10% in ‡ation rate was used for simplicity. 32 As Chanmugam et al. (2005) point out, for an acquirer expecting to reap $500 million in yearly cost savings from an M&A transaction, a one-month delay reduces the net present value of the deal by more than $150 million (assuming a 10 percent cost of capital). A seven-month delay costs nearly $1 billion in lost value, or approximately $3.5 million per day. 33 Although the world-wide turnover of the merging …rms -as documented in EC case reports -has been used in some empirical works to control for the size of the merger, this data is only available for around half of the cases, and observations are more likely to be missing for mergers with small pa. To my knowledge this paper is the …rst attempt to use the price paid for the merger transaction as a measure of the size of the transaction. 34 De ‡ated by using the same price index as for val.
an unsuitable regressor.
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Another possible determinant of the analysed entrepreneurial decisions is the complexity of the given merger. For example, a larger remedy package may be required if more horizontal overlaps are created. These remedies might be more di¢ cult to design and thus could take more time to o¤er. For measuring complexity, a proxy had to be found that was equally available for all cases in the sample. The number of horizontal overlaps was found to …t this purpose, therefore one aspect of complexity was measured by the proportion of overlaps with competition concerns to the total number of merger-created overlaps (covlperc).
36 Dummy variables were used to control for anticompetitive vertical (vert) and coordinated e¤ects (coor). The amount of time merging parties spend before notifying their merger may also a¤ect the litigation strategy. For example a noti…cation may be delayed as parties spend more time preparing the right remedy o¤er, or gathering evidence on the e¢ ciencies created by the merger. The time spent between the announcement of the merger and noti…cation may also serve as an indicator of cost of delay. For ease of interpretation, in the estimation a set of three categorical dummies were used to measure the number of working days between the announcement of the merger and noti…cation: less than 2 months (startc1), 2-4 months (startc2), more than 4 months (startc3). Information on this variable was collected from the same sources as val.
Finally, the type of the remedy was included in the estimations using three binary variables: divestiture only (div), behavioural only (beh) and both (div*beh).
37 Some of the estimated models also control for industry e¤ects, where dummy variables for industries as de…ned by the European Community's statistical classi…cation of 35 The case number was used to measure experience for example by GL. 36 Although other papers such as Bougette and Turolla (2006) , Bergman et al. (2007) , or LG use pre-, and post-market shares as a measure of horizontal e¤ects, that would require a market-based and not merger-based analysis. It is often not identi…able which markets the e¢ ciency claims, and pre-merger e¢ ciency expectations relate to, therefore the analysis was merger-level and not market-level. This explains the choice of the proxy for horizontal e¤ects.
37 Merger remedies are aimed at eliminating the anti-competitive e¤ects of a merger. This can be achieved by either rearranging the structure of the industry (structural remedy or divestiture) or by directly changing the behaviour of market players by requiring them to engage in a given type of behaviour (behaviour or conduct remedy). economic activities (NACE) is used. 38 The mean of these variables is presented in Table 2 , broken down into cases with and without pre-merger synergy expectations.
Model selection
At …rst, a consistent estimation method that produces e¢ cient estimates is found, then the estimation results are presented, which is followed by a discussion of these results.
Testing for treatment e¤ects
The fundamental problem that arises from measuring the causal e¤ect of a treatment is that treated individuals may be inherently di¤erent from untreated ones (i.e. the di¤erence between the two groups would be more than just the fact of the treatment). When measuring the e¤ect of e¢ ciency claims (the treatment) in merger litigation, the following is observed: E (rem s;t jef f = 1) E (rem s;t jef f = 0), which is the di¤erence in the outcome variables as a function of e¢ ciency claims. Now denote the outcome of remedy size/timing by rem s;t (1) for those mergers that reveal e¢ ciency claims, and rem s;t (0) for those individuals that do not. If only the treatment distinguishes the two groups, then the following equalities would hold:
Where E[rem s;t (1)jef f = 0] is the average remedy size/timing for mergers that reveal e¢ ciency-evidence, had they not revealed this evidence, and E[rem s;t (1)jef f = 0] is the expected remedy size/timing for mergers that do not reveal evidence had they revealed this evidence. As E[rem s;t (1)jef f = 0] and E[rem s;t (0)jef f = 1] are not observed, the equalities in Equation (4) are necessary to avoid bias. If Equation (4) does not hold, i.e. the treatment/no-treatment outcome (the timing and size of remedy-o¤er) is not the same for those treated and untreated (e.g. those that reveal and do not reveal e¢ ciency-evidence to the Commission), then the LHS, which is observed, cannot be used as a reliable stand-in for the RHS, which is unobserved. In these cases the estimated di¤erence between treated and not treated would be given by the average treatment e¤ect on the treated plus a selection bias:
This would be the case if, for example, one was to believe that those mergers that reveal e¢ ciency-evidence are less delay-averse. 39 Because of this inherent di¤erence in their attitude to delay, one could assume that these mergers are also more likely to o¤er smaller remedies upfront, causing the following (negative) selection bias:
There are other reasons to believe that there may be a selection bias when analysing the determinants of remedy-size. As mentioned earlier, CT argues that more e¢ cient mergers are less likely to o¤er large remedies, therefore if we accept that e¢ cient mergers are the ones revealing e¢ ciency-evidence, then OLS estimates will be negatively biased. To test whether single equation estimations provide unbiased results, a treatment e¤ects (TE) model was run for the estimable equations in Table 1 , the result of which is reported in Table 6 in the Appendix. The reported Wald test statistics imply that the null hypothesis of = 0 (i.e. that the estimated 39 Because …rms know that an e¢ ciency claim leads to a lengthy delay. 21 e¤ect of treatment from single-equation OLS estimation is unbiased) can be rejected for Equation (2) but not for Equation (3). This provides evidence that OLS is biased for Equation (2), therefore a TE model is preferred in that case.
Exogeneity of val and x n
The estimation of Equations (1)-(3) will be consistent only if none of the regressors are jointly determined with other observed or unobserved exogenous factors. Assumption 1 stated that E(x 0 n " n ) = 0 and E(val" n ) = 0, i.e. unobserved shocks do not jointly determine val and x n with the dependent variables. The problem with conducting a formal endogeneity test for x n , is the unavailability of data that would explain the variance in the elements of x n . However, White and Lu (2010) show that this is super ‡uous in a situation where we are only interested in estimating n . In this case the weaker assumptions of: E(y n " n jx n ) = 0, and E(val" n jx n ) = 0 should su¢ ce, where y i denotes the causal -and potentially endogenous -variables, and i = fef f; rem s g. This requires that elements of x n are only predictive (and not causal) in their relationship to the dependent variable, which becomes clear once these elements are introduced in the estimations.
The exogeneity of saving expectations (val) cannot be formally veri…ed within the scope of this paper as the necessary instruments are missing. However, intuition would tell us that the level of e¢ ciency expectations signalled to shareholders are not jointly determined with the probability of making e¢ ciency claims before the Commission or with the size and timing of the settlement o¤er. E¢ ciency signals to shareholders are very likely determined by …rm and industry speci…c characteristics that a¤ect the cost structure of …rms. On the other hand, e¢ ciency claims in litigation are probably strongly in ‡uenced by the way …rms perceive the Commission's practice, or the litigation strategy proposed by their legal advisors. Regarding remedy o¤ers, it is also more likely to be determined by and not determined with merger-generated cost savings.
Testing the endogeneity of y i
As the elements of …rms'merger litigation strategy may be determined by the same unobserved factors (for example some measure of cost of delay, managerial opportunism, or the quality of the legal advisor), it is possible that there is an endogeneity problem in equations, where either ef f or rem s or both appear on the RHS of the estimable equations.
As endogeneity tests compare the e¢ ciency and consistency of OLS and IV estimates, the elements of a vector of instruments (z n ) and exogenous variables for the structural equation (x n ) have to be chosen. Intuitively, e¢ ciency claims (ef f ) may be a¤ected by the observed factors of saving expectations signalled to shareholders or the amount of time …rms prepare for …ling a merger noti…cation. The size of the remedy o¤er (rem s ) is expected to be in ‡uenced by observed variables such as e¢ ciency claims in litigation, the complexity of the merger, or the type of remedy required by the Commission.
For the IV estimation the chosen instruments have to be valid and relevant. For the validity of instruments one needs the orthogonality assumption: E(z 0 n " n ) = 0, and for the relevance: E(z 0 n y n jx n ) 6 = 0. To ensure that a unique solution exists, it is also assumed that E(z 0 n x n ) has a full rank. Hahn and Hausman (2003) show that weak (non-relevant) instruments mean that the bias from the IV estimators is the same or worse than the bias from using OLS, and therefore nothing is gained by using IV. 40 Testing the relevance of instruments will be done by examining the …t of the reduced form (or …rst-stage) regressions.
Relevance of the instruments
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R 2 statistics to measure the partial e¤ect of excluded instruments on the endogenous variable(s) as proposed by Bound et al. (1995) are used for this purpose. 42 When there are two (or more) endogenous regressors, as in the case of Equation (3), then the e¤ect of instruments should be partialled out for each of the endogenous variables. For this reason Shea's (1997) partial R 2 measure cases that takes the intercorrelations among the instruments into account is also made use of. Table 5 reports the R 2 's for Equation (2) and Shea's partial R 2 's for Equation (3) where the endogeneity of two variables is jointly tested. These measures conclude that the used instruments are su¢ ciently relevant. As a con…rmation of this …nding, the results of Anderson canonical correlation tests are also reported. 43 The high Anderson test statistics (with a p-value of 0:062 in Equation (2) and 0:082 for Equation (3)) imply that the null (unidenti…ed equation) can be rejected and the relevance of instruments is con…rmed.
Validity of the instruments
As far as the validity of these instruments is concerned, it is a considerably more di¢ cult issue as one would need to show that the instruments are not correlated with the error term in the structural equation. Tests, proposed by Sargan (1958) will be used to test validity, whereby the residuals from the 2SLS estimation are regressed on all exogenous (included and excluded) instruments. 44 For orthogonality, the instruments should not have a signi…cant e¤ect on the residual. Assuming homoscedasticity, the Sargan test results reported in Table 5 imply that the nullhypothesis (i.e. that the instruments satisfy the orthogonality conditions) cannot be rejected in either Equation (2). 42 More precisely, this method partials out the e¤ect of the included instruments, by using the 'squarred partial correlation'between the excluded instruments z 1 and the endogenous regressor. It is de…ned by (RSS z2 RSS z )=T SS, where RSS z2 is the RSS of included instruments, and RSS z is the RSS when all instruments are used. 43 This test is based on the canonical correlation between two matrices, all exogenous variables, and the excluded exogenous variables. The null hypothesis of the Anderson test is that the smallest canonical correlation is zero, i.e. that the equations are not identi…ed. For a discussion on Anderson's test see : Hall et al. (1996) . 44 As Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 235 ) shows Sargan's test uses an estimate of the error variance from the IV regression estimated with the full set of overidentifying restrictions.
24
The non-i.i.d. errors in Equation (3) -tested later -justi…es a di¤erent validity test. For this heteroscedastic case, a Hansen J-statistic is obtained based on Hansen (1982) , which is probably the most frequently used measure of overidenti…cation and validity in GMM estimation. 45 A rejection of the null suggests that the orthogonality condition has been violated. The J-statistics are reported for the GMM regressions in Table 5 in the Appendix. The low …gures, with a p-value of 0.9045 when Equation (3) allows for both ef f and rem s to be endogenous, and 0.592 when only rem s is endogenous, imply that the null is not rejected. The above tests provide su¢ cient evidence that the available instruments satisfy both the validity and relevance criteria. With these instruments in hand, Equations (2) and (3) were estimated using di¤erent IV methods. First, a 2SLS estimation was conducted, followed by a heeteroscedasticity test. Both the estimates and the teststatistics are reported in Table 5 . Based on this, the homoscedasticity hypothesis was rejected for Equation (3). Hansen (1982) proposed that in this environment (i.e. unknown heteroscedasticity) the GMM estimates provide more e¢ cient estimators, by making use of the orthogonality conditions. For this reason GMM estimates are also reported for Equation (3). 
Testing endogeneity
Although the use of instruments provides consistent estimates when y n is correlated with " n , it comes at the price of losing the e¢ ciency of these estimates in comparison to OLS. Although this cost is worth bearing in situations where the OLS estimates would be biased but it would be a painful luxury if OLS also provides consistent estimates. For this reason, once valid and relevant instruments are found, the appropriateness of the OLS model was tested. For this reason the appropriateness of the OLS model was tested by comparing models using OLS and IV.
The Hausman test provides a measure that takes all regressors into account.
For the purposes of this paper, however, the focus of interest is on two variables, ef f and rem s , therefore a modi…ed version of the above test is su¢ cient for testing only a subset of regressors for endogeneity. 47 These test results (DWH-statistics in Table 5 ) report that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected for ef f either in Equation (2) or (3). 48 As far as rem s is concerned, there is some very weak evidence of endogeneity in Equation (3) but only when ef f was also treated as endogenous. When ef f is treated as exogenous -for which there is evidence -then the exogeneity of rem s cannot be rejected. This is probably due to the fact that the scope of instruments was limited in this research, therefore when both variables were assumed to be endogenous, the partial e¤ect of these instruments on rem s (i.e. the e¤ects not absorbed by ef f ) were such that exogeneity was rejected. As soon as all instruments were allocated solely to rem s , the test results changed.
To conclude this section, evidence was found for bias in the OLS estimation of Equation (2) and therefore a TE model is preferred in that case. To test endogeneity, a set of instruments were then tested and con…rmed for validity and relevance, and were used for IV regressions, which allowed a comparison to OLS. No evidence for the endogeneity of the two regressors of interest (ef f , and rem s ) was found, therefore OLS provides consistent estimates for Equation (3). Nevertheless, one caveat still has to be made. Although the test results suggest that ef f and rem s is not endogenous, it is based on the available instruments. There may be other unobserved reasons why a …rm reveals e¢ ciency evidence, and therefore there is a chance that those that reveal this evidence are not randomly chosen.
The probit, TE, and OLS estimates for Equations (1)-(3)
The results of the single-equation regressions, using probit for Equation (1) OLS and TE for (2) and OLS for (3), are reported in Table 3 . Model a) controls for all available factors, whereas model b) only includes those that were signi…cant in a). The table also reports the test-statistics (and p-values) of a Hausman test comapring models (a) and (b). For ease of reading, the hypotheses from Table 1 are inserted in the top rows.
Discussion
The probability of e¢ ciency claims -Hypothesis 1
No evidence was found to reject the hypothesis that …rms engage in mixed signalling. If …rms'e¢ ciency-related signals to shareholders are accepted as an adequate proxy for …rms'true e¢ ciency expectations, then this result implies that e¢ ciency evidence is not revealed, even when available. A source of this discrepancy probably stems from the Commission's ambiguous treatment of e¢ ciency claims. If one considers the Commission as a CA that commits to a rule that to some extent allows for e¢ ciency defence -as proposed by LH -these results show that much of the e¢ ciency related evidence is not extracted from mergers. This contradicts some assumptions that are often implicitly made in theoretical models of merger litigation, that is, mergers always reveal to the competition authority the e¢ ciency gains they expect from the merger.
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Another implication of the same …nding is that there is no evidence to reject the hypothesis that some …rms will apply for e¢ ciency defence even when they themselves do not have such expectations, as is assumed by CT. This evidence adds to the …ndings of LH as well; committing to an enforcement rule that allows e¢ ciency defence results in costs associated with rent seeking …rms spending resources on forging false evidence. On more of a side note, an interesting …nding is that given the other regressors, the ECMR reform in 2004 did not have an e¤ect on the probability of e¢ ciency arguments in the Commission's case reports, which is very peculiar given that one of the most often cited elements of the ECMR reform was the change in the attitude towards e¢ ciency related evidence. This is probably due to the fact that post-2004 e¢ ciency claims were still treated inauspiciously by the Commission and therefore the attitude of merging parties and their legal advisors toward e¢ ciency claims did not change signi…cantly.
Some evidence was also found that long preparation for the merger application increases the probability of making e¢ ciency claims before the Commission. As …rms and their legal advisors are certainly aware of the fact that e¢ ciency claims typically lead to lengthy investigations, mergers with lower cost of delay are more likely to make e¢ ciency claims before the Commission. Long delays pre-noti…cation may be a sign of lesser delay-averseness or lower delay costs. Table 4 summarises the e¤ect of e¢ ciency claims on remedy size and timing, based on the coe¢ cients of ef f , val, and val ef f . Signs show the estimates from the consistent model, signs in the bracket show the OLS estimates. The rankings are based on the estimates in Table 3 (1 denoting the largest and earliest remedy o¤er). Table 4 distinguishes between two main groups of cases, ones that have e¢ ciency expectations, and ones without such expectations. As was shown above, belonging to either of these groups does not have an e¤ect on whether …rms make e¢ ciency claims to the Commission. Some …rms make false e¢ ciency claims, and some of them withhold the evidence even if they have it, which is also shown in the table. The sign of the estimates show that …rms that blu¤ in their e¢ ciency claims make smaller and delayed remedy-o¤ers. The e¤ect of synergy expectations on the relative size of the remedy-o¤er depends on whether parties reveal e¢ cieny-related evidence to the Commission. When e¢ ciency-evidence is revealed then the more e¢ cient they think their merger will be, the smaller remedy-o¤er …rms are going to make. This is in line with CT, who argue that e¢ cient mergers value their assets higher and are therefore less willing to sell these assets as part of their settlement (divestiture remedy). The curious thing however is that this relationship only exists if …rms revealed their e¢ ciency expectations to the Commission. An intuitive explanation may be that only those mergers will resort to e¢ ciency defence that are less delay-averse. 50 For mergers where cost of delay exceeds cost of divestiture, …rms become more eager to seek a suitable settlement. 51 The fact that e¢ ciency claims are made implies reduced delay-averseness. In these cases the perceived cost of delay is probably smaller, and therefore other motivations may dominate, such as the one highlighted by CT. What this means for CT is that accounting for cost of delay could rewrite their results, and …rms, whose delay-costs exceed the loss experienced by asset divestiture may have an incentive to make larger remedy-o¤ers. Tests on treatment e¤ects provided evidence that …rms that reveal e¢ ciencyrelated evidence are inherently di¤erent in the size of their remedy-o¤er. This is potentially caused by the inherent di¤erence between the cost of delay of …rms that apply for e¢ ciency defence and …rms that do not. This is con…rmed by Table 4 , which shows that …rms with potentially the highest cost of delay (have evidence but withheld) o¤er larger and earlier remedies. Firms with revealed evidence are 50 Mergers that lose more with a delay are typically better at making sure that their litigation strategy results in earlier approval and are therefore ready to making an early and suitable settlement o¤er. 51 This e¤ect is further mitigated by the fact that in these cases shareholders have a higher expectation about the synergies to be realised. A delay in these cases would probably strongly decrease the shareholder evaluation of the merger, something that most managers would be eager to avoid.
Seeking early settlement -Hypothesis 2
expected to be less delay-averse because they have engaged in a lengthy e¢ ciency defence. These mergers o¤er the smallest but earliest remedies. This may be because they are blu¢ ng in their remedy-o¤er (as claimed in GL), or because they value their e¢ cient assets mode (as argued by CT), or because they try to tailor their remedy o¤ers to take e¢ ciency gains into account, as proposed by Röller and de la Mano (2006) . Those …rms that blu¤ in their e¢ ciency claims make smaller and more delayed remedy-o¤ers suggesting the lowest costs of delay.
Hypothesis 2b cannot be rejected either. High saving expectations signalled to shareholders imply earlier settlement o¤ers. Table 4 shows that cases di¤er depending on whether e¢ ciency claims have been made to the Commission. There is evidence in general that settlement o¤ers are made earlier as e¢ ciency expectations increase. However, this e¤ect is signi…cantly stronger in cases where e¢ ciency evidence is revealed. Cost of delay may provide an explanation to this result as well. Firms revealing e¢ ciency evidence to the Commission are less delay-averse, and could therefore be blu¢ ng in the remedy-o¤er. As blu¢ ng always has a risk of failure, these mergers make early o¤ers to allow themselves enough time to readjust their o¤er in case their blu¤ has been detected. 52 This is con…rmed by testing Hypothesis 4. Table 3 provides evidence that smaller remedies are more likely to be o¤ered earlier, which corresponds to the blu¢ ng strategy suggested by GL. Although this e¤ect was strongly present under the old-ECMR, it has signi…cantly diminshed after the 2004 ECMR reform, not because less …rms try to blu¤, but because in recent years remedy-o¤ers in general are all made early in the litigation. Table 4 also reveals that a clear indicator that distinguishes genuine e¢ ciency claims from blu¤s is the timing of the remedy o¤er. Firms that blu¤ in their e¢ ciency claims make signi…cantly delayed remedy-o¤ers. 52 To put it di¤erently, assuming that …rms follow the Commission's practice, they must be aware of the fact the e¢ ciency claims are likely to result in phase II investigations. Because of this they are in no hurry to o¤er an early remedy unless they want the Commission to ignore the e¢ ciency claims and approve the merger solely based on the remedy o¤ers. .) The evidence found here suggests that once parties reveal their e¢ ciency expectations to the Commission they wait with their remedy o¤er until the Commission decides on whether to accept the e¢ ciency claim or not, and o¤er their remedy subsequently if it is still needed.
E¤ect of e¢ ciency claims -Hypothesis 3
Röller and de la Mano (2006) pointed out the importance of the Commission tailoring remedies to take available e¢ ciencies into account. The purpose of this hypothesis was to test the attitude of merging parties to this issue. As partly discussed above, the coe¢ cient of ef f shows that e¢ ciency claims always reduce the size of the …rst remedy-o¤er. Again, this may be for a mixture of reasons, one of them is that …rms may indeed try to reduce the size of their remedy-o¤ers in order to re ‡ect potential e¢ ciency gains once these gains are known to the Commission (otherwise it would be pointless, as without the e¢ ciency claim, the Commission would have no e¢ ciency-evidence that could support a reduction in the size of remedy).
An interesting …nding is that once we control other factors the estimations did not …nd evidence that the complexity of the merger has an e¤ect on the timing of the …rst remedy o¤er. This implies that parties decide on when to make o¤ers, irrespective of the complexity (as measured by the number of overlaps and vertical or coordinated e¤ects) of the case, therefore a merger with numerous concerned overlaps is no more likely to be ready to make early o¤ers as a merger with only vertical e¤ects.
Robustness checks
The robustness and validity of Assumption 1 was discussed in Section 5.2 therefore only the remaining assumptions are examined here.
Assumption 2 stated that …rms …rst decide on whether to reveal e¢ ciency claims and then de…ne their settlement o¤er. This assumption is based on the fact that the EC encourages merging parties to reveal e¢ ciency claims in the pre-noti…cation stage of the procedure. Also, e¢ ciencies are assessed as part of the competitive analysis in EC merger procedures. This means that the Commission requires remedies only after the harm has been established, i.e. when merger-generated gains have already been taken into account. Nevertheless, if the size of the remedy or the timing of the remedy-o¤er had a causal e¤ect on revealing e¢ ciency claims before the Commission (i.e. if 11 6 = 0 or 12 6 = 0), then the system could be estimated following Keshk (2003) based on Maddala (1983) . Using the same variables as in the OLS estimation, the results thereby acquired show that none of the regressors have any impact on the dependent variables. As this contradicts the strong correlation between some of the variables, this possibility was rejected and Assumption 2 was maintained.
Assumptions 3a, 3b are about the pairwise independence of the error terms in Equations (1) and (2) and Equations (1) and (3). Although a formal test cannot be conducted to verify this assumption, intuition provides some guidance. This assumption means that the unobserved parts of the variance of the respective dependent variables are determined by the same unobserved factors. Intuitively, whether …rms reveal e¢ ciency-related evidence to the Commission is more likely to be in ‡u-enced by the way …rms perceive the Commission's practice, or the litigation strategy proposed by their legal advisors. Settlement (remedy) o¤ers on the other hand are probably determined by various characteristics (such as pro…tability) of the divestible assets that are o¤ered in settlements.
Finally, Assumption 4 introduces a one-way causality between the relative size of the remedy-o¤er and the timing of this o¤er. One alternative scenario would be, where neither 22 nor 32 equals zero (i.e. rem s causes rem t and vice versa), which would result in a system of simultaneous equations, that could be estimated using a two-stage or an instrumental variable method. The key question is what sort of prior can be brought into the estimation based on theory. Based on the discussion in Section 3.2, it is unlikely that …rms …rst decide on the timing of the o¤er and then set the size of the o¤er, therefore two-way cusality can be excluded.
Another alternative would be where neither of the dependent variables in Equations (2) and (3) appear on the RHS of these equations. This would mean that the correlation between rem s and rem t re ‡ects a purely predictive and not causal relationship. In the absence of such a causality (i.e. if 22 = 32 = 0), Equations (2) and (3) could be estimated by either OLS or, if corr(" 2 ; " 3 ) 6 = 0 then a seemingly unrelated regression can be used as explained in Zellner (1962) . To verify that this is not the case, the estimates of a seemingly unrelated regression are presented in Table 7 in the Appendix. The small Breusch-Pagan test statistics suggest that the null-hypothesis of independent rems and remt (more precisely independent residuals from the two equations) cannot be rejected, and therefore the OLS estimates are preferred.
Conclusion
The paper gave an empirical analysis of merging …rms' litigation strategy. It was shown that the current EC merger control regime is incapable of extracting information from …rms on their e¢ ciency expectations. Firms that expect their merger to generate e¢ ciency gains are more likely to make upfront remedy-o¤ers. E¢ ciency claims (valid or false) made to the Commission reduce the size of the remedy-o¤er, however false e¢ ciency claims can be distinguished by looking at the timing of the remedy-o¤er. Cost of delay plays a central role in designing …rms'litigation strategy, especially when these costs exceed the cost of the remedy.
The paper raises a few questions to the policymaker. Firstly, given the potential for rent seeking that results in forging false e¢ ciency evidence, it should be considered whether a procedural …ne should be introduced for providing false e¢ ciency-evidence. Secondly, the current practice of phase I and phase II investigations means that even e¢ cient …rms refrain from making e¢ ciency claims and they o¤er remedies instead, leading to potential type I errors in EC merger control. And …nally, better incentives to reveal e¢ ciency-evidence should be introduced, for example by requiring the Commission to make sure that remedies are tailored to take e¢ ciency-gains into account. 
